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Members of the United States Supreme Court frequently cite Rust v. 
Sullivan1 when analyzing issues implicating government speech or funding.  
Yet, there is sharp disagreement about how to characterize that case, and 
the competing versions have very different implications.  While the Court 
could offer an authoritative construction of Rust that would reduce if not 
eliminate the number of inconsistent Rust analyses, the justification for re-
jecting some of the competing versions might well provide the basis for un-
dermining several cases that have used Rust as a foundation.  The Court’s 
practice of citing Rust for very different constitutional approaches not only 
makes Rust difficult to understand, but also destabilizes the jurisprudential 
lines based on Rust.  A brief examination of the contradictory accounts of 
 
 * Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio. 
 1 See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
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Rust illustrates how the willingness of members of the Court to recharacter-
ize cases to reach a preferred result can undermine constitutional guaran-
tees and the rule of law. 
Part I of this Article discusses Rust, explaining both what the Court held 
and why it is subject to differing interpretations.  Part II discusses the oscillat-
ing characterizations of Rust, and how the Court has undermined various 
parts of First Amendment jurisprudence by its frequent Rust recharacteriza-
tions that conveniently provide the basis for a desired result.  The Article con-
cludes that unless the Court offers more consistent and plausible analyses of 
the various jurisprudential lines that Rust is used to support, both those lines 
and the Court’s remaining credibility may be undermined beyond repair. 
I.  RUST V. SULLIVAN 
Rust v. Sullivan was controversial for a number of reasons, not least of 
which was that it prohibited physicians who had received certain funds 
from discussing abortion with their patients.2  The Court provided several 
rationales for upholding the prohibition without making clear which of the 
rationales provided the basis for the opinion.  That failure made the opin-
ion even more difficult to understand and more open to criticism than it 
might otherwise have been. 
Rust involved the constitutionality of a federal program designed to fund 
family planning services.3  Because family planning can involve a whole 
range of services, the program’s intended scope needed clarification.  Con-
gress had specified that funds could not be used to support abortion as a 
method of family planning,4 but that still left open how the particular limi-
tation was to be interpreted.  The Court explained that Congress “intended 
to ensure that Title X funds would ‘be used only to support preventive fam-
ily planning services, population research, infertility services, and other re-
lated medical, informational, and educational activities.’”5  By limiting the 
use of the funds in this way, Congress made clear that the focus of Title X 
funding was for services prior to conception. 
In 1988, the Secretary of Health and Human Services explained that 
“Title X services are limited to ‘preconceptional counseling, education, and 
general reproductive health care,’ and expressly exclude ‘pregnancy care 
 
 2 Id. at 180 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1989)).  The Court, however, claimed that the regulation 
did not constitute a complete prohibition.  See id. at 196 (“The Secretary’s regulations do not 
force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee 
keep such activities separate and distinct from Title X activities.”). 
 3 Id. at 178 (“Title X of the Public Health Service Act (Act), 84 Stat. 1506, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300 to 300a-6, . . . provides federal funding for family-planning services.”). 
 4 Id. (noting that “[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in pro-
grams where abortion is a method of family planning”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988)). 
 5 Id. at 178–79 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 91-1667, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.)). 
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(including obstetric or prenatal care).’”6  Women seeking aid in determining 
the best ways to time their future pregnancies could be helped.  However, 
currently “pregnant women must be referred to appropriate prenatal care 
services.”7  Thus, the program’s provision of assistance in family planning 
was limited in that only pre-pregnancy services could be provided. 
A pregnant woman seeking advice from a physician employed at a Ti-
tle-X-funded facility could not receive counseling, because “the program 
does not furnish services related to childbirth.”8  Rather, such a patient 
would receive “transitional information,”9 i.e., a referral “for appropriate 
prenatal and/or social services” by way of “a list of available providers that 
promote the welfare of mother and unborn child.”10  However, “appropri-
ate” was defined in a particular way in that those making a referral were 
prohibited from directly or indirectly promoting abortion.  Not only was an 
employee of a “Title X project . . . expressly prohibited from referring a 
pregnant woman to an abortion provider,”11 but any referral list could not 
indirectly encourage abortion.12 
Suppose that a patient expressly asked to be referred to an abortion 
provider.  Although prohibited from making such a referral,13 the physician 
was not required to remain silent.  “One permissible response to such an 
inquiry is that ‘the project does not consider abortion an appropriate meth-
od of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abor-
tion.’”14  The physician had other alternatives as well, such as providing a 
list of health care providers including one or more who provided abortion 
among other services.15  However, the referring physician was precluded 
from “weighing the list of referrals in favor of health care providers which 
perform abortions”16 and was also precluded from “excluding available 
providers who do not provide abortions.”17  Finally, the referring physician 
 
 6 Id. at 179 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1989)). 
 7 Id. (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2925 (Feb. 2, 1988)). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1989)). 
 11 Id. at 180. 
 12 See id. (citing § 59.8(a)(3)) (explaining that a Title X project was expressly prohibited from indirect-
ly encouraging abortion through referrals). 
 13 Id. (“The Title X project is expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion 
provider, even upon specific request.”). 
 14 Id. (quoting  § 59.8(b)(5)). 
 15 Ann Brewster Weeks, The Pregnant Silence: Rust v. Sullivan, Abortion Rights, and Publicly Funded Speech, 
70 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1632–33 n.45 (1992) (“Referral lists were required to be weighted towards 
providers of prenatal care, but could include facilities providing abortion-related services . . . .” 
(citing New York v. Sulivan, 889 F.2d 401, 410–14 (2d Cir. 1989), aff’d sub nom. Rust, 500 U.S. 173). 
 16 Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (quoting § 59.8(a)(3)); see also Thomas Wm. Mayo, Abortion and Speech: A 
Comment, 46 SMU L. REV. 309, 309 (1992) (“[A] pregnant patient could not be given a referral 
list that is weighted in favor of health care providers who offer abortions.”). 
 17 Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (quoting § 59.8(a)(3)). 
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was prohibited from “‘steering’ clients to providers who offer abortion as a 
method of family planning.”18  The patient would have to figure out for 
herself which, if any, of those on the referral list would provide the abortion 
services she sought.19 
The Rust policy has been described as a gag rule, because physicians 
were prohibited from discussing abortion.20  While the Rust policy did not 
preclude patients from eventually securing an abortion, it decreased the 
likelihood that a patient would secure one.  Because the refusal list could 
not be weighted in favor of abortion providers and could not exclude pro-
viders merely because of their refusal to provide abortions, the policy in ef-
fect placed additional obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, 
even if those obstacles were not always insurmountable, given sufficient 
knowledge, tenacity, and means.21 
The Court quickly dispensed with the challenge that the regulation un-
constitutionally burdened a woman’s right to choose an abortion.  “Congress’ 
refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman 
with the same choices as if the Government had chosen not to fund family-
planning services at all.”22  While the Court was correct that many women 
would be no worse off as a result of the Rust policy than they would have 
been if Congress had refrained from funding family planning services as a 
general matter, it was unclear whether the Court was thereby announcing 
the relevant standard for the constitutionality of congressional funding.  If so, 
the Court was announcing a very deferential standard.23  But as Justice 
Blackmun noted in his dissent, government does not have carte blanche to 
fund whatever it wants as long as those not benefiting from the largesse 
would be no worse off than they would have been if Congress had simply 
withheld the funds as a general matter.  “[T]here are some bases upon which 
 
 18 Id. (quoting § 59.8(a)(3)). 
 19 See infra notes 22–23 and accompanying text (noting that the Court in Rust was correct in finding 
that women would be no worse off as a result of this policy than they would have been had there 
been no funding at all). 
 20 See Weeks, supra note 15, at 1624 (“In Rust the Court declared constitutional a set of controversial 
federal regulations known colloquially as the Gag Rules, which forbid health care providers at 
publicly funded family planning clinics from speaking with their patients about abortion.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
 21 See Linda Maher, Government Funding in Title X Projects: Circumscribing the Constitutional Rights of the 
Indigent: Rust v. Sullivan, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 143, 171 (1992) (“It may also leave her without ad-
equate time in which to safely seek an abortion, if she is confused by the restrictions or the limited 
medical advice.”). 
 22 Rust, 500 U.S. at 202; see also Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 764 (“[T]he Court engaged in an unspoken ‘greater includes the lesser’ 
analysis and described that this choice in funding is not the same as a penalty and leaves women 
in same position as if the federal funding did not exist at all.”). 
 23 Cf. Mark P. McKenna, Intellectual Property, Privatization and Democracy: A Response to Professor Rose, 50 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 829, 837 (2006) (“As Justice Scalia noted in a recent speech about government 
funding of the arts, it has long been the case that ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune.’”). 
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government may not rest its decision to fund or not to fund.  For example, 
the Members of the majority surely would agree that government may not 
base its decision to support an activity upon considerations of race.”24 
The petitioners had argued that the funding restriction placed undue 
limits on the doctor-patient relationship.25  But the Rust restriction was dis-
tinguishable from others requiring “all doctors within their respective juris-
dictions to provide all pregnant patients contemplating an abortion a litany 
of information, regardless of whether the patient sought the information or 
whether the doctor thought the information necessary to the patient’s deci-
sion.”26  The Court noted that doctors not receiving Title X funding were 
free to discuss abortion.27  While women might well have been better off if 
they were able to receive abortion counseling at a Title X funded facility, 
the “Constitution does not require that the Government distort the scope of 
its mandated program in order to provide that information.”28  Thus, the 
Court reasoned, while states cannot require all physicians to provide certain 
information to any woman contemplating an abortion, Congress can limit 
the services it funds by refusing to support abortion directly or indirectly. 
The Court’s analysis was dissatisfying for a number of reasons.  While a 
statute requiring all physicians to give their patients irrelevant or contra-
indicated information is of course objectionable, such a statute would not 
be transformed into acceptable legislation merely because it required many 
fewer physicians to give their patients irrelevant or contra-indicated infor-
mation.  An individual who has a consultation with her physician reasona-
bly expects to receive medical advice that is given in light of her needs, de-
sires, and condition in particular,29 and this federally imposed limitation 
might preclude a patient from hearing about the medically indicated pro-
cedure.  Perhaps a statute requiring that only a limited number of patients 
receive useless or misleading information is less objectionable than a statute 
that requires all patients to receive such information,30 but those receiving 
 
 24 Rust, 500 U.S. at 210–11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 25 Id. at 202 (majority opinion) (“Petitioners also argue that by impermissibly infringing on the doc-
tor-patient relationship and depriving a Title X client of information concerning abortion as a 
method of family planning, the regulations violate a woman’s Fifth Amendment right to medical 
self-determination and to make informed medical decisions free of government-imposed harm.”). 
 26 Id. at 203. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Cf. Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has 
Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1309 (2010) (“Whatever the government needed to do to 
ensure that it effectively communicated its family-planning policies to the public, that effort did 
not need to include suppressing the speech of healthcare workers who were advising individual 
patients about their specific conditions and treatments.”). 
 30 Or perhaps not, if the limited dissemination of misleading information has discriminatory effects.  
See Risha K. Foulkes, Abstinence-Only Education and Minority Teenagers: The Importance of Race in a Ques-
tion of Constitutionality, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 13 (2008) (noting that minority 
women of color were disproportionately affected by these restrictions). 
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this unhelpful information would likely find that their ability to make an in-
formed decision would have been undermined rather than improved.31 
While the Court may have been correct that “a doctor’s ability to pro-
vide, and a woman’s right to receive, information concerning abortion and 
abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X project remains 
unfettered,”32 this would be small consolation to those women who were 
not even alerted that their condition warranted serious consideration of an 
abortion.33  Nor would it be much consolation to those who had wrongly 
inferred that they should not seek an abortion based on the advice that they 
had received from a Title X funded physician,34 perhaps having relied on 
that physician to fulfill her professional responsibility to advance the pa-
tient’s medical well-being.35 
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted that “Title X grantees may pro-
vide counseling and referral regarding any of a wide range of family plan-
ning and other topics, save abortion.”36  This limitation was not merely a 
content-based restriction—“[t]he regulations are also clearly viewpoint 
based.”37  For example, “the regulations command that a project refer for 
prenatal care each woman diagnosed as pregnant, irrespective of the wom-
an’s expressed desire to continue or terminate her pregnancy.”38  Further, 
“[i]f a client asks directly about abortion, a Title X physician or counselor is 
required to say, in essence, that the project does not consider abortion to be 
an appropriate method of family planning.”39  But the patient might infer 
from such a statement that the physician herself did not believe abortion 
appropriate, which might well have been inaccurate. 
 
 31 Cf. Danielle Lang, Truthful but Misleading? The Precarious Balance of Autonomy and State Interests in Ca-
sey and Second-Generation Doctor-Patient Regulation, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1353, 1388 (2014) (“[A]t 
some critical point, the amount of information that the Nebraska and South Dakota dissuasion 
laws would have required would have likely disrupted the patient’s ability to make an autono-
mous and informed assessment of her options.”). 
 32 Rust, 500 U.S. at 203. 
 33 See id. (“Petitioners contend, however, that most Title X clients are effectively precluded by indi-
gency and poverty from seeing a health-care provider who will provide abortion-related ser-
vices.”). 
 34 Id. at 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Title X client will reasonably construe [her physi-
cian’s Government-controlled words] as professional advice to forgo her right to obtain an abor-
tion.”). 
 35 See id. at 213–14 (“[T]he physicians and counselors who staff Title X projects seek to provide 
[their clients] with the full range of information and options regarding their health and reproduc-
tive freedom.  Indeed, the legitimate expectations of the patient and the ethical responsibilities of 
the medical profession demand no less.”); see also Nicole B. Cásarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsi-
dies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 557 (2000) (“[T]hese 
predominantly lower-income women would hear this state-dictated information from those 
whom they were most likely to trust—their doctors and health service providers.”). 
 36 Rust, 500 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1990)). 
 39 Id. (citing C.F.R. 59.8(b)(4) (1990)). 
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An individual physician who felt ethically compromised by the limita-
tion40 on what she could say to her patient could simply refuse to be em-
ployed at a facility receiving Title X funds.41  But the patient might well be 
unaware that the physician who did advise her was prohibited from discuss-
ing all of the relevant options.42  When the Court suggested in City of Akron 
that “because abortion is a medical procedure, . . . the full vindication of 
the woman’s fundamental right necessarily requires that her physician be 
given ‘the room he needs to make his best medical judgment,’”43 the Court 
was suggesting that physicians as a general matter must be permitted to dis-
cuss abortion in appropriate cases and not merely that constitutional re-
quirements are satisfied as long as some physicians are permitted to discuss 
it with some of their patients.44 
While Rust was clear that the reviewed provision did not violate consti-
tutional guarantees, the Court was less than clear about why that was so.  It 
could have been because the Court did not believe the restriction particu-
larly burdensome45 or because the restriction was limited to a program that 
the government itself was funding.46  But these positions would have differ-
ing implications for other kinds of programs whose constitutionality might 
be challenged.  As to which understanding of Rust would ultimately be 
adopted, this would have to be decided at a later date. 
 
 40 Cf. id. at 213 (“[T]he physicians and counselors who staff Title X projects seek to provide them 
with the full range of information and options regarding their health and reproductive free-
dom.”). 
 41 Id. at 212 (“The Court concludes that the challenged regulations do not violate the First 
Amendment rights of Title X staff members because any limitation of the employees’ freedom of 
expression is simply a consequence of their decision to accept employment at a federally funded 
project.”). 
 42 Cf. Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the Demise of Dialogue, 46 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1473, 1608–09 n.456 (1994) (discussing “the poor woman who unsuspectingly 
walks into the only clinic she can afford and receives slanted government-funded misinfor-
mation”). 
 43 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983) (quoting Doe v. 
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992).  In Casey, the Court overruled Akron insofar as it found “a constitutional violation 
when the government requires . . . the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the 
nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable ges-
tational age’ of the fetus.”  Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, 
JJ.). 
 44 The Rust Court did not seem to think so.  500 U.S. at 203 (suggesting that the constitutional 
guarantees were not violated as long as physicians not receiving Title X funding remained un-
constrained). 
 45 See supra notes 27–28, 32 and accompanying text. 
 46 See supra notes 22, 27–28 and accompanying text. 
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II.  THE SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT OF RUST 
The Rust Court provided one rationale when upholding that re-
striction,47 but in subsequent decisions the Court recharacterized the Rust 
holding and rationale so that it stood for a very different proposition.48  The 
difficulty thereby raised was not merely that the understanding of the deci-
sion had been reformulated,49 but that the Court has gone back and forth 
between differing characterizations to reach particular results and, in at 
least some of the cases, a non-preferred interpretation would have led to a 
contrary result.  The Court’s oscillating characterizations of Rust when 
providing the basis for particular holdings underscore that the Court’s ap-
proaches to government speech and funding are unprincipled, which makes 
them especially unstable. 
A.  The Court’s Recharacterization of Rust 
The Court offered some clarifying remarks about Rust’s foundation in 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia.50  Rosenberger involved a 
challenge to the refusal of the University of Virginia to fund the printing 
costs of a student publication that “primarily promotes or manifests a par-
ticular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”51  Citing Rust, the 
University had argued that “content-based funding decisions are both in-
evitable and lawful.”52  However, the Rosenberger Court distinguished Rust.53  
While admitting that the Rust Court had “upheld the government’s prohibi-
tion on abortion-related advice applicable to recipients of federal funds for 
family planning counseling,” the Rosenberger Court characterized the Rust 
program in the following way: “[T]he government did not create a pro-
gram to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to 
 
 47 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund 
a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the 
same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another 
way.”). 
 48 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[In Rust], 
the government did not create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private 
speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program . . . . [W]hen the gov-
ernment appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say 
what it wishes.”). 
 49 Cf. Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based 
Speech Restrictions, 2009-2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 104 (2010) (“[T]the Supreme Court took 
the opportunity to reformulate the key passage in Chaplinsky and to recharacterize Ferber in ways 
that should strictly limit both decisions’ precedential force for further content-based re-
strictions.”). 
 50 See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 51 Id. at 823 (alteration in original). 
 52 Id. at 833. 
 53 Id. 
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transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.”54  The Rosen-
berger Court then explained that “when the government appropriates public 
funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it 
wishes” and, further, that “[w]hen the government disburses public funds 
to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate 
and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor dis-
torted by the grantee.”55  Thus, while the Rust Court had implied that the 
government was permitted to restrict its funding to messages of which it 
approved,56 the Rosenberger Court implied that the Rust restriction was per-
missible because the government, itself, was speaking. 
Once Rust was cabined, the Rosenberger Court explained that a different 
analysis is appropriate when the state “does not itself speak or subsidize 
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a 
diversity of views from private speakers.”57  When the state provides a fo-
rum for private speakers, it “may not silence the expression of selected 
viewpoints.”58  The Court’s characterizations of Rust as a government 
speech case and Rosenberger as a private speech case had important implica-
tions for the resolution of Rosenberger. 
Suppose that the Rust holding was that the government as funder was 
permitted to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint because, in effect, the 
government had decided that it was only willing to pay for speech that fa-
vored childbirth and was simply unwilling to fund pro-abortion speech.  
Were that the correct reading of Rust, then the University of Virginia would 
have been correct that Rust establishes the permissibility of a state deciding 
to discriminate among viewpoints by funding certain views and not others.59 
The University of Virginia had argued that it was engaging in content ra-
ther than viewpoint discrimination, because it was unwilling to fund any ap-
proach expressing a view about the existence of a deity or ultimate reality—
theists, agnostics, and atheists would all be denied funding.60  Thus, all 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–94 (1991). 
 57 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. 
 58 Id. at 835. 
 59 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 60 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“And since [the regulation] limits funding 
to activities promoting or manifesting a particular belief not only ‘in’ but ‘about’ a deity or ulti-
mate reality, it applies to agnostics and atheists as well as it does to deists and theists . . . .”); see al-
so Jennifer Lynn Davis, Note, The Serpentine Wall of Separation Between Church and State: Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1225, 1253 (1996) (“One sig-
nificant aspect of the Rosenberger opinion, then, is that the Court concluded that a prohibition on 
all forms of religious speech is viewpoint discrimination and not content discrimination.”). 
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viewpoints on a particular topic would not be funded.61  The Rosenberger 
Court rejected that the University was engaging in content rather than 
viewpoint discrimination,62 although the basis for that rejection was not en-
tirely clear.  While the dissent had argued that “no viewpoint discrimina-
tion occurs because the Guidelines discriminate against an entire class of 
viewpoints,” the Court explained that the dissent’s view “reflects an insup-
portable assumption that all debate is bipolar and that antireligious speech 
is the only response to religious speech.”63  But the dissent had not offered a 
bipolar view, instead having suggested that any of a range of views about 
the existence of a deity or ultimate reality would not receive funding.64 
The Court seemed to understand that the dissent was suggesting that 
more than two views were excluded, but then argued that the “dissent’s 
declaration that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced 
is simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways.”65  While the 
Court’s point would be well-taken were there several views on a particular 
subject and half of them were barred,66 the criticism is not persuasive when 
all of the voices on a particular topic are muted.67 
The Rosenberger Court was likely worried that viewpoint discrimination 
might be masked as content discrimination,68 an eventuality that the Court 
may itself have made more likely by suggesting that the difference between 
content and viewpoint discrimination is a matter of degree.69  Claiming that 
this was a matter of degree was especially unfortunate in the context under 
discussion because content discrimination is sometimes permissible in the 
context of a limited purpose public forum.70  “The necessities of confining a 
forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may 
justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of cer-
tain topics.”71  Thus, if the state-created limitations on a forum are reasona-
 
 61 See Mark Strasser, Leaving the Dale to Be More Fair: On CLS v. Martinez and First Amendment Juris-
prudence, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 235, 246 (2012) (“[T]the policy applied to all discussions of a 
particular kind of content, regardless of viewpoint.”). 
 62 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“We conclude . . . that here . . . viewpoint discrimination is the prop-
er way to interpret the University’s objections to Wide Awake.”). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See id. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing limiting funding to other groups of deists, atheists, 
and agnostics). 
 65 Id. at 831–32 (majority opinion). 
 66 Strasser, supra note 61, at 247 (“The Court’s construing the silencing of multiple voices as view-
point discrimination would be understandable if, for example, four views on a particular topic 
had been excluded while two or three other views on that same topic had been permitted.”). 
 67 Id. (“But the University had precluded providing financial support for any view on particular top-
ics, and thus had simply limited the forum by excluding certain contents.” (footnote omitted)). 
 68 Cf. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“[I]t must be acknowledged, the distinction is not a precise one.”). 
 69 See id. at 829 (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”). 
 70 See id. at 830 (“[C]ontent discrimination . . . may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that 
limited forum . . . .”). 
 71 Id. 
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ble in light of the state’s legitimate purpose, those limitations will be upheld.72  
That said, however, “viewpoint discrimination . . . is presumed impermissible 
when directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”73 
The Rosenberger Court had to overcome at least two obstacles if it was go-
ing to strike down the University’s refusal to fund the publication costs at 
issue.  First, assuming that the University had set up a limited purpose pub-
lic forum,74 the Court would either have to treat the restriction as view-
point-based or as content-based.  If the former, then the restriction likely 
could not pass muster.75  If the latter, then the restriction would be uncon-
stitutional only if not reasonable in light of the University’s purpose, a much 
easier standard for the University to meet.76 
After finding that the University’s restriction was viewpoint-based,77 the 
Court had no difficulty in plausibly suggesting that the University could not 
meet its burden when defending the constitutionality of its practice.78  But 
the Court’s approach to finding viewpoint rather than content discrimina-
tion creates potential difficulties in other cases involving limited public fora.  
If the removal of all rather than some viewpoints on a particular topic 
nonetheless counts as viewpoint discrimination,79 then limited public fora 
(when defined in terms of permissible contents80) would seem readily sus-
ceptible to attack by construing them as discriminating on the basis of 
viewpoint rather than content.81  The Court did nothing to reduce that 
vulnerability, e.g., by offering a helpful guide for determining when claimed 
content discrimination was in fact viewpoint discrimination.  Instead, the 
Court simply “acknowledged [that] the distinction is not a precise one,” 
and “conclude[d] . . . that . . . viewpoint discrimination is the proper way to 
 
 72 See id.  
 73 Id. at 830 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). 
 74 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 
at 837) (“We held [in Rosenberger] that by subsidizing the Student Activities Fund, the University 
had created a limited public forum, from which it impermissibly excluded all publications with 
religious editorial viewpoints.”). 
 75 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 76 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 77 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. 
 78 See id. at 832 (“The University’s denial of WAP’s request for third-party payments in the present 
case is based upon viewpoint discrimination not unlike the discrimination the school district re-
lied upon in Lamb’s Chapel and that we found invalid.”). 
 79 Strasser, supra note 61, at 247 (“The difficulty with the Rosenberger analysis was that it suggested 
that removing all viewpoints on a particular topic was nonetheless viewpoint rather than content 
discrimination.”). 
 80 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)  (citing Good News Club v. Mil-
ford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–107 (2001)) (“In such a [limited purpose] forum, a government 
entity may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”). 
 81 Strasser, supra note 61, at 247 (“Such an analysis suggests that a limitation on content will simply 
be interpreted as a limitation of multiple viewpoints and will then be subject to the kind of scruti-
ny reserved for viewpoint discrimination.”). 
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interpret the University’s objections to Wide Awake.”82  The Court did not 
even point to the facts or practices establishing that the University was en-
gaging in viewpoint discrimination, and instead seemed to be adopting a 
“we know it when we see it” approach to viewpoint discrimination.83 
Suppose that the Court could offer a persuasive account of why Rosen-
berger involved viewpoint rather than content discrimination.84  Even so, the 
Rosenberger Court had to overcome a second obstacle, namely, that Rust 
seemed to establish that the government could fund some viewpoints with-
out funding others.85 
The Rosenberger analysis of why Rust was distinguishable because involv-
ing government speech86 was not particularly plausible—the doctors did 
not view themselves as spokespersons for the government;87 the patients did 
not view their doctors that way either;88 and the Rust Court itself did not 
seem to view the case as one involving government speech.89  Further, the 
Rust recharacterization has important implications for state beliefs regard-
ing the appropriate practice of medicine.  In effect, the Rosenberger account 
of Rust implies that the state recommends certain medical approaches (and 
not others) without considering the particular needs of the patient.90  To 
 
 82 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. 
 83 Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today at-
tempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand 
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see 
it . . . .”). 
 84 Cf. Cásarez, supra note 35, at 529 (arguing that the University of Virginia’s “regulation appears to 
carry a significant risk of viewpoint discrimination”). 
 85 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“[T]he Government has not discriminated on the 
basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”); id. at 
194 (“When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other 
countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a program 
to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” (citing 22 
U.S.C. § 4411(b) (1988)); Alan Trammell, The Cabining of Rosenberger: Locke v. Davey and the 
Broad Nondiscrimination Principle That Never Was, 92 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1999 (2006) (“If Rust stood 
for the proposition that the government had wide discretion in its funding decisions, the Universi-
ty had arguably acted within the zone of its discretion.”). 
 86 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 87 Arthur N. Eisenberg, The Brooklyn Museum Controversy and the Issue of Government-Funded Expression, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 275, 306 (2000) (“In fact, such physicians did not regard themselves merely as 
spokespersons for the government nor can it be plausibly claimed that their patients regarded 
them simply as government messengers.”). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Trammell, supra note 85, at 1999 (“Judging by the language of Rust, there is no reason to think 
that it has anything to do with the government speech or public forum cases.”). 
 90 As I’ve explained elsewhere, such a recommendation is not credible.  See Mark Strasser, Ignore the 
Man Behind the Curtain: On the Government Speech Doctrine and What It Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
85, 92 (2011) (“Yet, it is not credible for the government to tell a particular patient (without 
knowing anything at all about that patient) that it would be best for her not to have an abor-
tion.”); cf. Gey, supra note 29, at 1309 (“Whatever the government needed to do to ensure that it 
effectively communicated its family-planning policies to the public, that effort did not need to in-
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make matters worse, the government was making a recommendation that 
might have been antithetical to the patient’s needs without informing her 
that the government never believes abortion a viable option—only if she 
asked about abortion might she be told that the project did not consider 
abortion appropriate.91  If she did not ask, then she might well make un-
warranted assumptions about whether an abortion would have been ap-
propriate in her case.92 
The Rosenberger Court reached its desired result by clarifying certain 
matters and obscuring others.  Forum doctrine became more confused, e.g., 
because it became less clear how to tell whether a limited purpose public 
forum involved content rather than viewpoint discrimination.93  In contrast, 
the Court offered a clarification of Rust by explaining that the case involved 
government speech,94 although that characterization was not particularly 
plausible.95 
After Rosenberger, the Court’s policy seemed clear.  When the government 
is speaking (even through private individuals), the government is permitted 
to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.  However, when the government is 
not itself speaking but instead has set up a forum for private speech, discrim-
ination on the basis of viewpoint is not permissible.96  Yet, this approach was 
brought into question97 in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.98 
 
clude suppressing the speech of healthcare workers who were advising individual patients about 
their specific conditions and treatments.”). 
 91 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 209 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(4) 
(1990)). 
 92 Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 605, 670 (2008) (“[C]onfusion about whether the doctor’s communication represents gov-
ernment policy (as claimed in Rust) or expert advice may lead the patient to believe that her doc-
tor ruled out abortion as a medically viable option for her in particular.”). 
 93 See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.  Or, the Court might have been making a different 
claim sub silentio. See Strasser, supra note 61, at 249 (“The Court might implicitly have been chal-
lenging the reasonableness of limiting a university forum in such a way that discussions promot-
ing or opposing religious points of view are excluded.”). 
 94 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“When the gov-
ernment disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take 
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the 
grantee.” (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196–200)). 
 95 See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 96 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834 (suggesting that viewpoint discrimination is permissible when the 
government is the speaker but not when the government is encouraging private speakers to ex-
press a variety of viewpoints). 
 97 See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., NEA v. Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 
2 (1999) (“Much of the confusion in the [Finley] opinion seems quite deliberate, as if to suggest 
that the Court decided to reach a result it found difficult to justify under existing precedent, thus 
producing an opinion that through obscurity might cause as little damage as possible to the exist-
ing doctrinal framework.”). 
 98 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572–73 (1998) (ruling that National En-
dowment for the Arts grant criteria are facially valid as not interfering with First Amendment 
rights). 
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B.  The Court Changes Course 
At issue in Finley was a congressional mandate requiring the Chairper-
son of the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) to “tak[e] into con-
sideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs 
and values of the American public”99 before granting artists public funding.  
Members of Congress believed the additional requirement necessary after 
they became aware that NEA funds had been used to mount an exhibition 
of Robert Mapplethorpe’s homoerotic work100 and had been used to sup-
port the work of Andres Serrano, who had created “Piss Christ,” which 
some believed sacrilegious.101 
The Court considered whether the decency and respect “provision is a 
paradigmatic example of viewpoint discrimination because it rejects any ar-
tistic speech that either fails to respect mainstream values or offends stand-
ards of decency.”102  But the Court took issue with the claim that such works 
must be rejected, instead noting that the National Endowment for the Arts 
“reads the provision as merely hortatory, and contends that it stops well 
short of an absolute restriction.”103  The contested section did “not preclude 
awards to projects that might be deemed ‘indecent’ or ‘disrespectful,’ nor 
place conditions on grants, or even specify that those factors must be given 
any particular weight in reviewing an application.”104  Because Congress 
had merely required that such works be disfavored rather than that they not 
receive funding under any circumstances,105 the Court suggested that this 
was not the kind of restriction that violated constitutional guarantees.106 
Allegedly, “the ‘decency and respect’ criteria do not silence speakers by 
expressly ‘threaten[ing] censorship of ideas.’”107  The Court reasoned that 
“the varied interpretations of the criteria and the vague exhortation to ‘take 
 
 99 Id. at 572 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994)). 
100 Id. at 574 (citing 135 Cong. Rec. 22372 (1989)) (“The Institute of Contemporary Art at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania had used $30,000 of a visual arts grant it received from the NEA to fund a 
1989 retrospective of photographer Robert Mapplethorpe’s work . . . [which] included homoe-
rotic photographs that several Members of Congress condemned as pornographic.”). 
101 Id. (citing 135 Cong. Rec. 9789 (1989) (“Members also denounced artist Andres Serrano’s work 
Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix immersed in urine.  Serrano had been awarded a $15,000 
grant from the Southeast Center for Contemporary Art, an organization that received NEA sup-
port.”). 
102 Id. at 580. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 580–81. 
105 Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Instead of banning the funding of such pro-
ductions absolutely, which I think would have been entirely constitutional, Congress took the 
lesser step of requiring them to be disfavored in the evaluation of grant applications.”). 
106 Id. at 590 (majority opinion) (“Section 954(d)(1) merely adds some imprecise considerations to an 
already subjective selection process.  It does not, on its face, impermissibly infringe on First or 
Fifth Amendment rights.”). 
107 Id. at 583 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992)). 
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them into consideration’”108 made it “unlikely that this provision will intro-
duce any greater element of selectivity than the determination of ‘artistic 
excellence’ itself.”109  Thus, the Court seemed to say, because mainstream 
values and decency might be interpreted in many different ways, these ad-
ditional considerations would be unlikely to have the chilling effect that was 
feared.  Yet, it was not as if artists seeking funding would have no idea 
which viewpoints were disfavored.  As Justice Scalia noted in his concur-
rence in the judgment, the limitation at issue was adopted in response to the 
funding of the work of Mapplethorpe and Serrano,110 which meant that art-
ists would be on notice with respect to some kinds of work that would be 
disfavored.111  Justice Scalia readily admitted that this was viewpoint dis-
crimination,112 although he believed such discrimination constitutionally 
permissible.113  As a further reason not to strike down the provision, the 
Court explained that “[a]ny content-based considerations that may be tak-
en into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the na-
ture of arts funding.”114  Precisely because the NEA has limited funds, that 
agency must of necessity “deny the majority of the grant applications that it 
receives, including many that propose ‘artistically excellent’ projects.”115  
Thus, it was not as if an individual artist would have a reasonable expecta-
tion that he or she would receive funding, given that the number of indi-
viduals seeking funding greatly exceeded the available funds.116 
While the Court was correct that the demand for funding exceeded the 
supply of grant dollars, that was beside the point.  The whole issue was wheth-
er aesthetically excellent entries could be denied funding based on the artist’s 
 
108 Id. at 583–84. 
109 Id. at 584; see also Harold B. Walther, Note, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: Sinking 
Deeper into the Abyss of the Supreme Court’s Unintelligible Modern Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 59 
MD. L. REV. 225, 239 (2000) (“The Court . . . further justif[ied] their finding that a clear penalty 
did not exist in § 954(d)(1) by stating that because people would generally not agree as to what 
constitutes ‘decency’ and ‘respect,’ ‘the provision does not introduce considerations 
that . . . would effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular views.’” (quoting Finley, 
524 U.S. at 583)). 
110 Finley, 524 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
111 Cf. id. at 589 (majority opinion) (“We recognize, as a practical matter, that artists may conform 
their speech to what they believe to be the decisionmaking criteria in order to acquire funding.”). 
112 Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“This unquestionably constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination.”). 
113 See id. at 598 (“[T]he congressional determination to favor decency and respect for beliefs and 
values over the opposite [is constitutional] because such favoritism does not ‘abridge’ anyone’s 
freedom of speech.”). 
114 Id. at 585 (majority opinion). 
115 Id. 
116 See Ingber, supra note 42, at 1613–14 (“The amount of money allotted by the government to be 
dispensed by the NEA will always be limited and exceeded by the number of applicants.  Scarcity 
requires a competition among applicants for grants, as a grant given to one artist is necessarily 
denied to another.” (footnote omitted)). 
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expressed viewpoint.117  Merely because some criteria were used to exclude 
would hardly mean that viewpoint was also an appropriate consideration. 
Consider college admissions.  Elite schools may have many more de-
serving applicants than they can admit.118  Yet, merely because college ad-
missions are very competitive would not somehow establish that an individ-
ual could be denied admission because of an irrelevant consideration such 
as her minority racial status.  Such a policy would be unconstitutional, pre-
cisely because the use of one of the factors, even if not dispositive, was 
nonetheless irrational and a violation of constitutional guarantees.119 
Ironically, after suggesting that the competitive nature of the grant fund-
ing made it permissible for viewpoint to be considered in the process, the 
Finley Court explained that “[i]f the NEA were to leverage its power to 
award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfa-
vored viewpoints, then we would confront a different case.”120  However, the 
Court did not specify what kinds of problems would be posed if the NEA 
were penalizing disfavored viewpoints.  The Court might merely have been 
suggesting that such an interpretation would have misconstrued congres-
sional intent,121 or the Court might have been suggesting that penalizing dis-
favored viewpoints would have violated First Amendment guarantees.122 
The Court reaffirmed that “Congress has wide latitude to set spending 
priorities,”123 and cited Rust for the proposition that “Congress may ‘selec-
tively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the 
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program 
 
117 See Kristine M. Cunnane, Note, Maintaining Viewpoint Neutrality for the NEA: National Endowment 
for the Arts v. Finley, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1472 (1999) (“Although the NEA is a selective 
funding program, selectivity does not justify viewpoint discrimination in supporting private 
speech.”). 
118 See Michael A. Olivas, Higher Education Admissions and the Search for One Important Thing, 21 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 993, 994 (1999) (“Elite undergraduate institutions, highly regarded grad-
uate programs, and competitive professional schools are more alike than they are different: select-
ing among many qualified applicants requires similar procedures that cut across types of 
schools.”). 
119 See Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (“[A] plaintiff who challenges an ongoing race-
conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not affirmatively establish that he would 
receive the benefit in question if race were not considered.  The relevant injury in such cases is 
‘the inability to compete on an equal footing.’” (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)). 
120 Finley, 524 U.S. at 587. 
121 See id. at 600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Congress took the lesser step of requiring 
them to be disfavored in the evaluation of grant applications.”). 
122 See id. at 587 (majority opinion) (“[T]he First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy 
context . . . .”); id. (“[E]ven in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not ‘ai[m] at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).  But see id. at 600 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“[B]anning the funding of such productions absolutely . . . would have been entirely 
constitutional . . . .”). 
123 Id. at 588 (majority opinion) (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 549). 
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which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.’”124  But Rosenberger 
had suggested that Rust only authorized selective funding where govern-
ment was itself the speaker,125 and there was no suggestion that the NEA 
was only funding the government’s message.  Indeed, Justice Souter noted 
in his dissent that “this patronage falls embarrassingly on the wrong side of 
the line between government-as-buyer or -speaker and government-as-
regulator-of-private-speech.”126 
The government-as-speaker explanation of Rust permitting the govern-
ment to articulate its own views without articulating competing views127 
does not permit the government to penalize the expression of disapproved 
viewpoints when the government is not speaking.128  On that understanding 
of Rust, Finley should have been decided differently, as Justice Souter ob-
served.129  While the government-as-spender explanation of Rust supported 
the Finley holding,130 it undermined the result in Rosenberger.131  Basically, 
Rust is being used in incompatible ways. 
C.  Another About-Face 
Rust was controversial at least in part because it construed a federally 
funded program providing medical services as the government’s expressing 
its own views through private individuals.  The Rust approach was the focus 
of an analysis in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.132 
 
124 Id. (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)); see also Bloom, supra note 97, at 15 
(“[T]he majority explained that the Government has wide discretion to choose spending priori-
ties or to engage in selective funding without discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.”). 
125 See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (asserting that the Rosenberger Court read Rust as 
permitting government restriction on the funding of messages only when the government itself 
was the speaker). 
126 Finley, 524 U.S. at 612 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
127 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (“When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to 
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles . . . it was not constitutionally required 
to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and 
fascism.” (citing 22 U.S.C. § 4411(b) (1988)); see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (“[I]t seems inevitable that funds raised by the government 
will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies.” (citing 
Rust, 500 U.S. at 193)). 
128 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (explaining that the government’s ability to restrict 
funding on messages does not apply to private speakers). 
129 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting Justice Souter’s Finley dissent, which drew a line 
between government-as-speaker or -buyer and government-as-regulator-of-private-speech). 
130 Cf. Finley, 524 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation 
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)) (“It is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy 
with measures “‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”). 
131 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (suggesting that if the Rust Court had held that the gov-
ernment as a funder was able to discriminate based on viewpoint, Rosenberger would have been 
decided differently). 
132 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
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At issue in Velazquez was the constitutionality of restrictions imposed on the 
Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”).133  The Legal Services Corporation pro-
vided funds to local organizations to provide legal representation to indigents 
on non-criminal matters.134  However, Congress had specified that funding 
could not be provided to assert that “a state statute conflicts with a federal 
statute or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application 
is violative of the United States Constitution.”135  That did not mean that 
LSC-funded attorneys were barred from helping their indigent clients, be-
cause “an LSC grantee could represent a welfare claimant who argued that an 
agency made an erroneous factual determination or that an agency misread 
or misapplied a term contained in an existing welfare statute.”136 
The program at issue in Velasquez was analogous in some ways to the 
program at issue in Rust.  In each, Congress had expressly limited what it 
was willing to fund137—Congress refused to promote abortion in Rust138 and 
refused to promote challenges to the legality or constitutionality of particu-
lar laws in Velasquez.139 
When analyzing the constitutionality of the LSC prohibition, the Court 
first offered its Rosenberger interpretation of Rust.140  The Rust and Velasquez 
programs were distinguishable because “the LSC program was designed to 
facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message.”141  Alt-
hough the government needs to constrain the use of funds142 when “estab-
lish[ing] a subsidy for specified ends,”143 the Velasquez Court worried that up-
 
133 Id. at 536 (“This suit requires us to decide whether one of the conditions imposed by Congress on 
the use of LSC funds violates the First Amendment rights of LSC grantees and their clients.”). 
134 Id. (“LSC’s mission is to distribute funds appropriated by Congress to eligible local grantee organ-
izations ‘for the purpose of providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal pro-
ceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
2996b(a) (2000)). 
135 Id. at 537. 
136 Id. at 538. 
137 See id., 531 U.S. at 553 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that like the scheme in Rust, the LSC Act 
placed restrictions on the use of funds). 
138 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that funds could not be used to support abortion 
as a method of family planning). 
139 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (describing challenges to laws for which LSC funds 
could not be used). 
140 See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (“As we said in Rosenberger, ‘[w]hen the government disburses public 
funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropri-
ate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); 
Gabriel J. Chin & Saira Rao, Pledging Allegiance to the Constitution: The First Amendment and Loyalty 
Oaths for Faculty at Private Universities, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 431, 457 (2003) (“The Rosenberger formu-
lation was followed in Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez . . . .”). 
141 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542. 
142 See id. at 543 (“[C]ertain restrictions may be necessary to define the limits and purposes of the 
program.” (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 53 (1983)). 
143 Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991)). 
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holding the limitation would “insulate the Government’s interpretation of the 
Constitution from judicial challenge.”144  Yet, as Justice Scalia noted in his 
dissent, “No litigant who, in the absence of LSC funding would bring a suit 
challenging existing welfare law is deterred from doing so by § 504(a)(16).”145 
The difficulty posed in Velasquez was not in its refusal to hold that the at-
torneys were speaking for the government but in its apparent acceptance of 
the proposition that the doctors in Rust were speaking for the government.  
As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, “If the private doctors’ confidential 
advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‘government speech,’ it is 
hard to imagine what subsidized speech would not be government 
speech.”146  Further, if attorneys’ professional responsibilities might be 
compromised by agreeing to the imposed limitations at issue in Velasquez, 
the same would have been true of the physicians agreeing to the imposed 
limitations at issue in Rust.147  Finally, the insulation of the government’s 
position from challenge would not be any greater as a result of the limita-
tion on LSC funding than would have occurred had Congress provided no 
funding for these kinds of cases,148 which mirrored the response offered by 
the Court to the challenge in Rust on the limitations on Title X funding.149 
Rust and Velasquez became even more difficult to understand when the 
Court issued United States v. American Library Association (ALA).150  At issue was a 
congressional limitation imposed on federal funding of public libraries.  Un-
der the Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”),151 “a public library may 
not receive federal assistance to provide Internet access unless it installs soft-
ware to block images that constitute obscenity or child pornography, and to 
prevent minors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to them.”152 
By providing access to the internet, libraries offer their patrons a wealth 
of information.153  But they also thereby provide ready access to a great 
deal of pornography, and many patrons, including minors, do online 
 
144 Id. at 548. 
145 Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
146 Id. 
147 See id. (“[T]he majority’s contention that the subsidized speech in these cases is not government 
speech because the lawyers have a professional obligation to represent the interests of their clients 
founders on the reality that the doctors in Rust had a professional obligation to serve the interests 
of their patients . . . .”). 
148 Cf. id. at 556 (“It may well be that the bar of § 504(a)(16) will cause LSC-funded attorneys to de-
cline or to withdraw from cases that involve statutory validity . . . . The same result would ensue 
from excluding LSC-funded lawyers from welfare litigation entirely.”). 
149 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 202 (1991) (stating that the difficulty a woman faces when a 
Title X project fails to provide abortion counseling or referral leaves her no worse off than she 
would have been had the government not enacted Title X). 
150 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion) . 
151 20 U.S.C. §§ 9134 (2000). 
152 ALA, 539 U.S. at 199. 
153 Id. at 200. 
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searches for sexually explicit material.154  Filtering devices can prevent pa-
trons from accessing these pornographic sites,155 although these filters not 
only block pornography but other material that is neither obscene nor por-
nographic.156  The challenge to the restriction was that Congress had con-
ditioned receipt of the funds on the libraries using filters that restricted con-
stitutionally protected speech.157 
The Court began its analysis by discussing whether the libraries them-
selves would violate constitutional guarantees by choosing to employ the fil-
tering software.158  Certainly, if libraries were constitutionally prohibited from 
limiting access to constitutionally protected information then Congress’s at-
tempting to induce libraries to do so would be constitutionally problematic.159 
It did not take long for the Court to reject the claim that libraries are 
constitutionally required to provide “universal coverage.”160  Libraries are 
subject to financial constraints,161 so libraries must of course “consider con-
tent in making collection decisions.”162  They would neither be able to pur-
chase all the materials that they might like nor could they house all of those 
materials anyway. 
One need not worry about space considerations in the same way when the 
issue involves the internet,163 since the relevant space considerations involve 
the terminals themselves rather than all of the data that might be accessed us-
ing the terminals.164  That said, however, space considerations are not the only 
 
154 Id. (citing Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 419 (E.D. Pa. 2002), overruled 
by ALA, 539 U.S. 194 (plurality opinion)).  
155 Id. (“[F]iltering software that blocks access to pornographic Web sites could provide a reasonably 
effective way to prevent such uses of library resources.”). 
156 Id. at 201 (“But a filter set to block pornography may sometimes block other sites that present 
neither obscene nor pornographic material, but that nevertheless trigger the filter.”). 
157 Id. at 210 (“Appellees argue that CIPA imposes an unconstitutional condition on libraries . . . by 
requiring them, as a condition on their receipt of federal funds, to surrender their First Amend-
ment right to provide the public with access to constitutionally protected speech.”). 
158 Id. at 203 (“To determine whether libraries would violate the First Amendment by employing the 
filtering software that CIPA requires, we must first examine the role of libraries in our society.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
159 Id. (“Congress may not ‘induce’ the recipient ‘to engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutional.’” (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987)). 
160 Id. at 204 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2002), 
overruled by ALA, 539 U.S. 194 (plurality opinion)). 
161 Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment’s Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and School Li-
braries: What Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1127 (2000) (“[L]ibraries, due 
to their limited budgets, compile their collections based on the roles they choose for serving the 
needs, interests, and priorities of their community.”). 
162 ALA, 539 U.S. at 205. 
163 Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, 
and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799, 
849 (2006) (“[V]irtual offerings are not subject to limits on shelf space or resources.”). 
164 That said, there may be limits on the number of terminals that can be provided, which might 
mean that libraries could not afford to offer patrons unlimited access.  See Mitchell P. Goldstein, 
Congress and the Courts Battle over the First Amendment: Can the Law Really Protect Children from Pornography 
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concern when libraries limit their collection, because libraries might want to 
impose some quality control on the materials that can be accessed.165 
The ALA plurality suggested that the library’s collection was “to facili-
tate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of 
requisite and appropriate quality.”166  But if users are prevented from see-
ing non-obscene, non-pornographic material, they might be limited in their 
efforts to learn, do research, or pursue recreational pursuits.  Nonetheless, 
libraries must make choices in light of existing limitations and the current 
technology might not be sufficiently sophisticated to block out only the tar-
geted materials.167  Further, because libraries do not have the resources to 
decide which sites on the internet in particular should be blocked and 
which should not,168 it seems reasonable for libraries to adopt restrictions 
that may not be perfectly tailored to keeping out only those contents that 
the library wishes to exclude.169  For these reasons, the plurality held that 
libraries do not violate constitutional guarantees when using filters that re-
strict some constitutionally protected materials.170 
Yet, the challenge at issue did not involve a policy the libraries had 
freely adopted but the congressionally imposed condition on the receipt of 
funds.  The appellees had argued that that the congressional limitation was 
unconstitutional because it required the libraries, “as a condition on their 
 
on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141, 186 n.288 (2003) (citing Am. Li-
brary Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 465 n.25 (E.D. Pa. 2002), overruled by ALA, 539 
U.S. 194 (plurality opinion)) (discussing the district court’s observation that, like “the scarcity of a 
library’s budget and shelf space,” “the scarcity of time at Internet terminals constrains the librar-
ies’ ability to provide patrons with unrestricted Internet access”). 
165 See ALA, 539 U.S. at 204 (“[L]ibraries collect only those materials deemed to have ‘requisite and 
appropriate quality.’” (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 421 
(E.D. Pa. 2002), overruled by ALA, 539 U.S. 194 (plurality opinion)); see also Goldstein, supra note 
164 (suggesting that unlimited access might be counterproductive for the users). 
166 ALA, 539 U.S. at 206. 
167 See id. at 215 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing how the employed technology 
both blocks material that should not be blocked and fails to block material that should be 
blocked). 
168 Id. at 208 (plurality opinion) (“[L]ibraries cannot possibly segregate, item by item, all the Internet 
material that is appropriate for inclusion from all that is not.”). 
169 Id. (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for public libraries to . . . exclude certain categories of content, 
without making individualized judgments that everything they do make available has requisite 
and appropriate quality.”); see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Speech and Institutional Choice, 21 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 67, 76 (2006) (“The Court held that the burden imposed by the statute on library 
patrons was substantially reduced by the fact that libraries have traditionally exercised substantial 
discretion in deciding what materials to make available to the public.  Given this, it was permissi-
ble for Congress to piggyback the CIPA filters on the libraries’ institutional role as mediators of 
information to further the (ostensibly permissible) statutory objective of limiting children’s access 
to indecent content.”) 
170 ALA, 539 U.S. at 208 (“A library’s need to exercise judgment in making collection decisions de-
pends on its traditional role in identifying suitable and worthwhile material; it is no less entitled to 
play that role when it collects material from the Internet than when it collects material from any 
other source.”). 
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receipt of federal funds, to surrender their First Amendment right to pro-
vide the public with access to constitutionally protected speech.”171  The 
government had countered that “Government entities do not have First 
Amendment rights.”172 
Rather than address whether public entities have First Amendment 
rights, the plurality instead addressed whether Congress had violated con-
stitutional guarantees by conditioning the receipt of funds on the libraries 
filtering protected as well as unprotected speech.  Citing Rust, the plurality 
explained: “Within broad limits, ‘when the Government appropriates pub-
lic funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that pro-
gram.’”173  This understanding of Rust was compatible with Finley,174 but 
undermined the holdings in Rosenberger175 and Velasquez.176 
The plurality specifically addressed why Velasquez was not controlling, 
noting that “the role of lawyers who represent clients in welfare disputes is 
to advocate against the Government, and there was thus an assumption that 
counsel would be free of state control.”177  In contrast, libraries “have no 
comparable role that pits them against the Government, and there is no 
comparable assumption that they must be free of any conditions that their 
benefactors might attach to the use of donated funds or other assistance.”178 
Yet, the plurality’s analysis was misleading in a few different respects.  
First, in Velasquez, the LSC funding was appropriately used against the gov-
ernment in that LSC attorneys were permitted to represent an individual 
who (allegedly) had wrongly been denied benefits.179  Perhaps the govern-
ment had made a factual error or an agency had misinterpreted one of the 
relevant criteria for benefits.180  The LSC attorneys were only restricted 
 
171 Id. at 210. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 211 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
174 For a discussion of Finley, see supra notes 99–130 and accompanying text. 
175 For a discussion of Rosenberger, see supra notes 50–96 and accompanying text. 
176 For a discussion of Velasquez, see supra notes 132–149 and accompanying text. 
177 ALA, 539 U.S. at 213. 
178 Id.; see also Lillian R. BeVier, United States v. American Library Association: Whither First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 172  (“[T]he plurality distinguished Legal Services Corp. v Ve-
lasquez on the ground that, unlike legal advocates for the poor, public libraries do not occupy a 
role that ‘pits them against the Government.’” (quoting ALA, 539 U.S. at 213)).  But see Leading 
Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 355 (2003) (“[A] library’s interest may conflict with attempts by 
the federal government to control libraries’ collection decisions . . . .”). 
179 Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 538 (2001) (“LSC interpreted the statutory 
provision to allow indigent clients to challenge welfare agency determinations of benefit ineligibil-
ity under interpretations of existing law.”). 
180 Id. (“[A]n LSC grantee could represent a welfare claimant who argued that an agency made an 
erroneous factual determination or that an agency misread or misapplied a term contained in an 
existing welfare statute.”). 
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from arguing against the government on certain matters, e.g., the unconsti-
tutionality of welfare laws.181 
Libraries might have a comparable role pitting them against the gov-
ernment insofar as they are to provide patrons with a wealth of materials.  
Consider the observation by the Rust Court that Congress could promote 
democracy without promoting communism or fascism.182  Suppose that 
Congress conditioned receipt of federal funds on the library not acquiring 
books on a competing form of government, say, communism.  Because li-
braries enjoy great discretion in making their choices about what to 
stock,183 let us assume that it would be permissible for a library to choose to 
stock books on other subjects rather than on communism.  But even if a li-
brary could choose to refrain from buying books about other political sys-
tems, that would hardly establish that it should do so.  A library might well 
be pitted against the government if the government wanted to limit patron 
access to political information.  Further, it might be noted that the ALA ra-
tionale would permit the government to condition the receipt of federal 
funding on a library choosing not to acquire certain political tracts, since 
the library itself could presumably decide to forego acquiring such tracts 
and the government is given great discretion with respect to which political 
messages it wishes to send or support. 
In Rust, the Court explained that women were no worse off as a result of 
the Title X funding than they would have been had there been no federal 
funding of family planning.184  However, in ALA, even computers bought 
with state funds had to be equipped with the filter,185 so that constitutionally 
protected information that might otherwise have been accessible (because 
unfiltered) would now be inaccessible.  This means that some patrons 
would be in a worse position as a result of the funding because denied ac-
cess to materials that they might otherwise have seen. 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that the plurality was engaging in 
a bit of sleight of hand.  While admitting that libraries have discretion to 
make decisions about what is in their collection,186 he argued that the issue 
 
181 Id. at 538–39 (“Under LSC’s interpretation, however, grantees could not accept representations 
designed to change welfare laws, much less argue against the constitutionality or statutory validity 
of those laws.”). 
182 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“When Congress established a National Endowment 
for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitu-
tionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as 
communism and fascism.” (citing 22 U.S.C. § 4411(b) (1988)). 
183 ALA, 539 U.S. at 205. 
184 Rust, 500 U.S. at 202. 
185 Barbara A. Sanchez, Note, United States v. American Library Association: The Choice Between 
Cash and Constitutional Rights, 38 AKRON L. REV. 463, 492 (2005) (“CIPA conditions funding on 
installing filters on every single computer, even those wholly funded with state and local dollars.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
186 ALA, 539 U.S. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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was more complicated than that.  Congress would presumably be constitu-
tionally precluded from penalizing libraries for failing to install the filtering 
software,187 and an “abridgment of speech by means of a threatened denial of 
benefits can be just as pernicious as an abridgment by means of a threatened 
penalty.”188  Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court to note that 
the plurality’s description of Rust did not comport with the treatment of that 
decision in other cases: “[A]s subsequent cases have explained, Rust only in-
volved, and only applies to, instances of governmental speech—that is, situa-
tions in which the government seeks to communicate a specific message.”189 
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. 
(AID)190 only made the analysis harder to understand.  At issue was the con-
stitutionality of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuber-
culosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (“Leadership Act”).191  The Act appropri-
ated billions of dollars to be distributed to non-governmental organizations 
to help fight the spread of HIV/AIDS.192  However, two conditions were 
imposed on that funding: (1) “no funds made available by the Act ‘may be 
used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or 
sex trafficking,’”193 and (2) “no funds may be used by an organization ‘that 
does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex traffick-
ing.’”194  At issue was whether the second provision violates the First 
Amendment rights of would-be recipients.195 
The Court began its analysis by noting that Congress has broad discre-
tion in deciding how to spend monies to promote the general welfare.196  
Further, the Court cited Rust for the proposition that Congress can “impose 
limits on the use of . . . funds to ensure they are used in the manner Con-
gress intends.”197  After all, a party objecting to a condition need not accept 
the funding, and this is true even when it is alleged that the condition affects 
“the recipient’s exercise of its First Amendment rights.”198 
Yet, the Court reasoned that Congress was limited with respect to the 
conditions that could be placed on the receipt of federal funding.  While 
 
187 Id. (citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)). 
188 Id. at 227. 
189 Id. at 228; cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 437 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“We have 
read Rust to mean that ‘when the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular 
policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.’” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
190 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). 
191 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601–7682 (2012). 
192 AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2324. 
193 Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2012)). 
194 Id. at 2324–25 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2012)). 
195 Id. at 2325. 
196 Id. at 2327–28. 
197 Id. at 2328 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991)). 
198 Id. (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) (plurality opinion)). 
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admitting that “[t]he line is hardly clear,” the Court argued that “the rele-
vant distinction that has emerged from our cases is between conditions that 
define the limits of the government spending program—those that specify 
the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to lever-
age funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”199  
To illustrate the distinction, the Court discussed Rust among other cases.200 
Rust established that “Congress can, without offending the Constitution, 
selectively fund certain programs to address an issue of public concern, 
without funding alternative ways of addressing the same problem.”201  But 
Rust recognized that there were limits on the restrictions that Congress 
could impose.  The AID Court noted that Rust had distinguished between 
limitations on the grantee and limitations on the project,202 and that the 
funding limitation only governed the project and did not govern other ac-
tivities in which the grantee might be engaged.203  The AID Court conclud-
ed that because the Title X “regulations did not ‘prohibit[ ] the recipient 
from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally 
funded program,’ they did not run afoul of the First Amendment.”204 
While it is true that the Rust Court noted that grantees and their employ-
ees were permitted to discuss abortion outside of the Title X project,205 it 
may be helpful to consider how to determine what was within the confines 
of the project and what was not.  The Rust Court made clear that merely 
keeping Title X funds separate through careful bookkeeping would not suf-
fice.206  Instead, several factors would be considered in “a case-by-case de-
termination of objective integrity and independence, such as the existence of 
separate accounting records and separate personnel, and the degree of phys-
ical separation of the project from facilities for prohibited activities.”207 
The approach at issue in AID was analogous to the approach in Rust in 
several respects.  Funded organizations could work with independent or-
ganizations that did not espouse the official anti-prostitution position208 as 
 
199 Id. 
200 See id. at 2321, 2328–30. 
201 Id. at 2329–30 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193, 196 (1991)). 
202 Id. at 2330 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196). 
203 Id. (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196). 
204 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 197). 
205 Rust, 500 U.S. at 183 (“Title X grantees and their employees ‘remain free to say whatever they 
wish about abortion outside the Title X project.’” (quoting New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 
412 (2d Cir. 1989), aff’d sub nom. Rust 500 U.S. 173).  
206 Id. at 180. 
207 Id. at 180–81; see also AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2329 (“To enforce this provision, HHS regulations 
barred Title X projects from advocating abortion as a method of family planning, and required 
grantees to ensure that their Title X projects were ‘physically and financially separate’ from their 
other projects that engaged in the prohibited activities.” (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 180–81)). 
208 See AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2326 (“The guidelines permit funding recipients to work with affiliated or-
ganizations that ‘engage [ ] in activities inconsistent with the recipient’s opposition to the practic-
es of prostitution and sex trafficking’ as long as the recipients retain ‘objective integrity and inde-
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long as those latter organizations were sufficiently independent from the 
grantee in light of certain objective criteria,209 just as Title X facilities could 
refer to independent facilities that provided abortions among other ser-
vices.210  The AID Court noted that a “recipient cannot avow the belief dic-
tated by the Policy Requirement when spending Leadership Act funds, and 
then turn around and assert a contrary belief, or claim neutrality, when 
participating in activities on its own time and dime.”211  But performing the 
prohibited activity on one’s own dime and time (without doing additional 
things to establish separation) would have involved mere bookkeeping that 
would not have won the day in Rust either.212  Indeed, the claim that Con-
gress was acting unconstitutionally because limiting how non-Title-X funds 
would be used (e.g., where a facility received both Title X funding and oth-
er funding too) was expressly considered and rejected in Rust.213  In Rust, 
any activity favoring abortion rights would not only have to have been on 
the organization’s own dime and time,214 but also performed by different 
personnel and in a different physical location.215 
The point here should not be misunderstood.  The AID Court’s limita-
tion on the degree to which Congress can impose restrictions on funding 
recipients may be compatible with certain cases.216  Further, that approach 
may well have been very sensible as a matter of public policy, because there 
was testimony that requiring the agencies to espouse an anti-prostitution 
message would have impeded their ability to do their work.217  But the AID 
 
pendence from any affiliated organization.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 
(2011); see also Nicholas Bruno, Note, Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open 
Society International: An Alternative Approach to Aid in Analyzing Free Speech Concerns Raised by Govern-
ment Funding Requirements, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1569, 1575 (2015) (“If the NGO had ‘objective integri-
ty and independence’ from such an affiliate organization, the NGO could still receive funding 
from the HIV/AIDS program even if the affiliate organization did not explicitly oppose prostitu-
tion.” (quoting § 89.3)). 
209 AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2326–27 (“Whether sufficient separation exists is determined by the totality of 
the circumstances, including ‘but not . . . limited to’ (1) whether the organizations are legally sep-
arate; (2) whether they have separate personnel; (3) whether they keep separate accounting rec-
ords; (4) the degree of separation in the organizations’ facilities; and (5) the extent to which signs 
and other forms of identification distinguish the organizations.” (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 89.3(b)(1)–
(5) (2011))). 
210 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
211 AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2330. 
212 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
213 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187–88 (1991). 
214 See AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2330. 
215 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
216 See AID, 133 S. Ct. at 2328–29 (claiming that the account explains Regan v. Taxation with Rep-
resentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) and FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cali-
fornia, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)).  But see id. at 2334 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“None of the cases the 
Court cites for its holding provide support.”). 
217 Id. at 2326 (majority opinion) (“Respondents fear that adopting a policy explicitly opposing pros-
titution may alienate certain host governments, and may diminish the effectiveness of some of 
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Court’s account of Rust was not plausible.  Further, the previous jurispru-
dence which (sometimes) suggested that the government had great discre-
tion when hiring individuals to communicate its own message would seem 
to support the government’s having had discretion to prefer certain groups 
rather than others to carry out its program.218  A separate question is 
whether the government was impeding its own efforts by requiring organi-
zations to articulate an anti-prostitution message, but that consideration 
seemed to speak to the wisdom of the policy rather than to whether Con-
gress in light of the past jurisprudence had the power to condition the re-
ceipts of funds in this way.219 
CONCLUSION 
Rust has been cited both for the proposition that the state has great dis-
cretion when attaching conditions to the receipt of state funding and that 
the state only has great discretion when funding its own message.  Neither 
position is absurd on its face and each might be adopted if in line with the 
past case law.  The difficulty posed by Rust has been that the Court has os-
cillated between these holdings when deciding cases even when the alterna-
tive holding would have required a different result. 
One expects jurisprudence to evolve, so the fact that a case no longer 
stands for what it once did need not be a basis for criticism.  What is so un-
usual about Rust is that the Court seesaws between incompatible accounts 
of the case with no explanation of why one account rather than another is 
offered.  The Court thereby promotes the perception that its holdings are 
result-oriented and unprincipled, and offers no guidance to those who wish 
to act in accord with the law.  This cavalier treatment of Rust is likely to 
have spillover effects, undermining the Court’s credibility in First Amend-
ment matters more generally.  The Court must stop treating cases as lumps 
of clay, ready to be pressed into whatever shape is desired for the creation 
of the day.  First Amendment jurisprudence and the Court’s own integrity 






their programs by making it more difficult to work with prostitutes in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS.”). 
218 See id. at 2332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Policy Requirement is nothing more than a means of 
selecting suitable agents to implement the Government’s chosen strategy to eradicate 
HIV/AIDS.”). 
219 Cf. id. at 2333 (“The program is valid only if the Government is entitled to disfavor the opposing 
view (here, advocacy of or toleration of prostitution).  And if the program can disfavor it, so can 
the selection of those who are to administer the program.”). 
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